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and answering time as well as psychometrically determined 
item difficulty and sleep deprivation.
Methods We performed a think-aloud procedure to explore 
faculty’s thought processes while taking these MCQs, cod-
ing think-aloud data based on reasoning process (analytic, 
nonanalytic, guessing or combination of processes) as well 
as word count, number of stated concepts, reading time, an-
swering time, and accuracy. We also included questions re-
garding amount of work in the recent past. We then conduct-
ed statistical analyses to examine the associations between 
these measures such as correlations between frequencies of 
reasoning processes and item accuracy and difficulty. We 
also observed the total frequencies of different reasoning 
processes in the situations of getting answers correctly and 
incorrectly.
Results Regardless of whether the questions were classified 
as ‘hard’ or ‘easy’, non-analytical reasoning led to the cor-
rect answer more often than to an incorrect answer. Signifi-
cant correlations were found between self-reported recent 
number of hours worked with think-aloud word count and 
number of concepts used in the reasoning but not item ac-
curacy. When all MCQs were included, 19 % of the vari-
ance of correctness could be explained by the frequency of 
expression of these three think-aloud processes (analytic, 
nonanalytic, or combined).
Discussion We found evidence to support the notion that 
the difficulty of an item in a test is not a systematic feature 
of the item itself but is always a result of the interaction be-
tween the item and the candidate. Use of analytic reasoning 
did not appear to improve accuracy. Our data suggest that 
individuals do not apply either System 1 or System 2 but 
instead fall along a continuum with some individuals falling 
at one end of the spectrum.
Abstract
Background An ongoing debate exists in the medical edu-
cation literature regarding the potential benefits of pattern 
recognition (non-analytic reasoning), actively comparing 
and contrasting diagnostic options (analytic reasoning) 
or using a combination approach. Studies have not, how-
ever, explicitly explored faculty’s thought processes while 
tackling clinical problems through the lens of dual process 
theory to inform this debate. Further, these thought pro-
cesses have not been studied in relation to the difficulty of 
the task or other potential mediating influences such as per-
sonal factors and fatigue, which could also be influenced 
by personal factors such as sleep deprivation. We therefore 
sought to determine which reasoning process(es) were used 
with answering clinically oriented multiple-choice ques-
tions (MCQs) and if these processes differed based on the 
dual process theory characteristics: accuracy, reading time 
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Introduction
A physician’s practice is centred around clinical reasoning—
arriving at the correct diagnosis and a treatment strategy 
that is specific to a patient’s circumstances and preferences. 
Assessing clinical reasoning, however, is difficult given the 
inability to directly observe a physician’s thought processes 
and the resulting necessity to always infer their reasoning 
from observable behaviour [1].
Developments in the assessment of clinical reasoning 
have come a long way since the reliance on more or less 
authentic patient simulations in the 1960s–1980s [2, 3]. 
Back then, the prevailing notion was that presenting can-
didates with a clinical problem, asking them to request all 
the relevant information and then scoring all diagnostic and 
therapeutic decisions was the optimal way to assess clinical 
reasoning. This idea, however, proved to be incorrect, espe-
cially for high-stakes decisions, such as licensure, where 
these approaches were shown to be seriously flawed both in 
their reliability and construct validity [4].
Since then, clinical reasoning developments have moved 
in two main directions: one focusing on the intermediate 
or final outcomes of the decision-making process, such as 
key-feature approach testing and extended-matching items 
[5, 6], and others focusing on the underlying process itself, 
such as the script concordance test [7]. The assumption of 
the former is that a correct outcome of the process reflects 
a correct process, while the latter approach asserts that a 
correct process would lead to a correct outcome. We have 
learned from all these developments, though, and it now 
appears that the matter of clinical reasoning and its assess-
ment are far more complicated than was assumed in those 
early decades [1].
In the general context of naturalistic decision making, 
theories of metal models being defined as metal representa-
tions argued that metal models are an interplay of knowl-
edge, perception, and comprehension. Further, metal models 
can be analyzed in terms of concepts and their relations. A 
leading theory used to understand the cognitive processes 
of clinical reasoning is dual-process theory [8], which dis-
tinguishes two processes: non-analytic and analytic reason-
ing. The former, also called System 1, relates to fast and 
effortless unconscious thinking (e.g. pattern recognition). 
The latter, also called System 2, denotes the slow and effort-
ful process of problem solving by conscious analysis. This 
theory has been applied in many other fields in addition to 
clinical reasoning [9].
The discourse about both systems in clinical reason-
ing is complex. Generally, with respect to System 2, it is 
assumed that when it comes to reasoning, the clinician 
actively compares and contrasts features of the problem at 
hand with features of prototypical cases or abstract repre-
sentations in his/her memory to find the optimal solution 
[8]. Immediate and more intuitive solutions—as an effect of 
System 1 processes—are seen as the result of retrieving the 
most appropriate exemplar or script for the problem at hand 
from memory. Better System 2 processing is associated 
with higher general ability, including intelligence. Supe-
rior System 1 processing is seen as the result of extensive 
experience and expertise [8]. This is plausibly related to the 
findings in expertise research and the notion of deliberate 
practice, which basically agree that becoming an expert is a 
matter of building a large database of robust prototypes and 
well-retrievable experiences or an array of flexibly appli-
cable problem-solving strategies [10].
Research shows that the best predictor for successful 
(diagnostic) clinical reasoning is the quality of System 1 
processing—in particular the probability of the correct diag-
nosis being considered by the clinician [11]. Research also 
suggests that the most common source of diagnostic error 
is the failure to engage in System 2 reasoning when System 
1 is not sufficient [11]. There are, however, still unresolved 
issues in the relation between both systems and successful 
clinical reasoning. For example, one perhaps unexpected 
finding is that non-analytical reasoning is more effective 
if the number of features that need to be considered in the 
problem solving process is large, and that the analytical 
System 2 route is more effective in cases where the prob-
lem is ‘simpler’ [12, 13]. Additionally, others argue that the 
optimal clinical reasoning strategy/ies is likely dependent 
upon the situation or, better, the specific relation between 
the complexity of the problem and the level of expertise of 
the clinician [14, 15].
This creates a paradox, however, as one expert may see 
a problem as simple that other experts may see as difficult. 
Following Dijksterhuis’ argument it would then be best for 
the most expert physician to engage in analytic reasoning 
because his/her expertise allows him/her to reduce the prob-
lem to a few information-rich chunks (due to non-analytic 
reasoning) which can be easily analyzed to produce the best 
solution. For a novice, on the other hand, this would not 
be possible and he/she would be best served by approach-
ing the problem non-analytically. But this is paradoxical as 
the novice has not had the time or experience to develop 
sufficient exemplars or chunks to rely on non-analytical 
reasoning.
This raises the question whether our conceptions of diffi-
culty or complexity of a test item for the assessment of clini-
cal reasoning are in line with theories on clinical reasoning. 
Often, aggregate performance data are used to distinguish 
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Measurements
Multiple-choice questions (MCQs)
We used validated MCQs from the American Board of 
Internal Medicine (ABIM) and National Board of Medical 
Examiners (NBME) in this investigation. These organiza-
tions are responsible for licensing physicians in the US and 
they validate the appropriateness of their items by subject-
ing them to a rigorous internal content review and perfor-
mance analysis.
The vignette-based MCQs selected required the integra-
tion and synthesis of data, and items queried ‘What is the 
most likely diagnosis?’ (i.e. the examination items were 
designed to assess clinical reasoning at least partly as a Sys-
tem 2 process [19]. Participants answered a total of 32 ques-
tions: 16 NBME items (United States Medical Licensing 
Examination [USMLE] Step 2 Clinical Knowledge items) 
and 16 ABIM items (Maintenance of Certification [MOC] 
MCQ). We selected questions that fit on a single screen and 
contained only words (i.e. there were no chest X-rays or 
other images) and with good item discrimination indices. 
Participants pushed handheld buttons for answer options ‘A’ 
to ‘E’. Item accuracy was used as a dependent variable.
As these were items used in national examination we 
could select them based on whether they were considered 
hard or easy items. We intentionally selected easy and hard 
items from each of the two question sources (total of 14 easy 
and 18 hard items; 16 of these items were cardiology and 16 
were rheumatology) as we sought to explore the interaction 
of reasoning performance with item difficulty, a dependent 
variable. Easy and hard items were defined by the percent-
age of test takers answering the items correctly; easy items 
were defined as the ones with a p-value higher than .70 and 
hard items with a p-value of lower than .20.
Participants were instructed to push the button as soon as 
they were done reading the item, which ended with a diag-
nostic question, per above, but without A–E options. Par-
ticipants had up to 60 s to do so. Next, participants entered 
the answering phase where they had up to 7 s to select the 
A–E answer. Time was recorded for pushing the buttons to 
the 10− 8 s level.
Think-aloud
Immediately following completion of the items, partici-
pants underwent a formal think-aloud procedure so that we 
could explore thought processes, through the lens of dual 
process theory, with answers. These think-aloud data were 
used as an independent variable. Think-aloud protocols are 
a way to explore the thought processes of a participant while 
they complete a task [20, 21]. Currently, think-aloud proto-
col methodology, either during the task or retrospectively 
hard from easy problems. Dual processing theory and those 
arguing that reasoning is situation specific would rather sup-
port an individualized notion, namely that an item can only 
be hard or easy for a person depending on his/her specific 
experience with the (type of) problem at hand [16, 17]
In other words, the contention is that hard versus easy 
or complex versus straightforward is mainly determined 
by the interaction between the test taker and the problem, 
rather than being predominantly a feature of either, which 
differs from our current psychometric stance. But even if 
this were the case, the question remains whether this inter-
action between the problem and the candidate can be seen 
as a relatively stable facet or if it can be influenced by other 
factors. Fatigue and sleep deprivation, for example, have 
been shown to be associated with medical errors and thus 
a variety of other situational influences may impact on the 
optimal communication between both process strategies in 
a dual-process architecture [18]. Thus, fatigue could alter 
the relationship between candidate and assessment item. 
Finally, current assumptions view non-analytic and ana-
lytic reasoning more as a dichotomous system (e.g. you are 
using one or the other system vs. a more continuous use of 
both)—this stance should be explicitly tested.
In this study involving board-certified internal medi-
cine physicians, we sought to understand the relationship 
between faculty physicians’ (experts) reasoning processes, 
assessment items used for national exam purposes as prob-
lems, and the psychometrically determined difficulty. In 
addition, we sought to study the influence sleep depriva-
tion, as one situation specific factor, would have on this 
relationship.
Method
Board-certified internists answered a series of multiple 
choice items that had been used in a large sample of partici-
pants with known psychometric characteristics followed by 
a formal think-aloud procedure so that their answers could 
be linked with their thought processes.
Participants
Following informed consent, 22 board-certified internal 
medicine attending physicians (faculty or experts) with 
faculty appointments at the Uniformed Services University 
(USU) participated in the study. The study was approved 
by the Institutional Review Boards of the USU and Walter 
Reed Army Medical Center.
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We then used the individual question as the unit of analy-
sis and provided an overview of the frequencies of think-
aloud processes in six situations—getting the hard questions 
right, getting the hard questions wrong, getting the easy 
questions right, getting the easy questions wrong, total 
questions right, and total questions wrong. We calculated 
each participant’s frequency of expressing non-analytic rea-
soning, combined approach, analytic reasoning, and guess-
ing in think-aloud. We investigated the Pearson correlations 
between these categorical measures (reasoning by think-
aloud coding), item accuracy and hours worked in the last 
3 days and last 48 hours. Again, we did this procedure for 
all MCQs, hard MCQs only, and easy MCQs only. In addi-
tion, we performed t-tests to see whether the participants’ 
expression of these think-aloud processes differed between 
hard and easy questions. Finally, we performed multiple 
regression analysis to examine the influence of express-
ing combined approach, analytic reasoning, and non-ana-
lytic reasoning, considered together, on number of MCQs 
answered correctly.
Results
Table 1 displays item difficulty by national standards, 
reasoning strategy by think-aloud categorization and per-
centage correct. The following codes were used following 
review of the data and discussions leading to consensus 
following coding of approximately 15 % of the data. Each 
MCQ think-aloud was given one code. The codes were 
guessing, analytic, non-analytic, combined, and other (the 
last referring to utterances that could not be coded). Guess-
ing involved explicitly stating that one was unsure about the 
correct answer.
Examples: I have no idea.
My answer is a complete guess.
Analytic reasoning involved explicit comparing and con-
trasting diagnoses (or other key data) by the examinee.
after the task, is seen as an acceptable procedure to capture 
thought processes such as clinical reasoning [10, 22]. We 
chose to conduct the think-aloud activity retrospectively as 
we did not want it to interfere with actual answering and, 
in particular, with non-analytic reasoning. The think-aloud 
procedure was used to differentiate examinee use of System 
1, System 2, a combination of both, or guessing, on an item-
by-item basis. As we sought to use dual-process theory as 
our theoretical lens, we also counted the number of words 
uttered on the think-aloud with each MCQ, as well as num-
ber of concepts to further help with distinguishing System 1 
and System 2 use.
Additional measures
As a measure of fatigue (an independent variable) prior to 
answering questions, participants completed a survey, con-
taining questions about hours worked in the days just prior 
to completing this study. While answering items, we cap-
tured reading time and answering time as well as if the item 
was answered correctly or not. Reading and answering time 
were also used to inform the use of dual processing strategy 
(nonanalytic expected to be associated with shorter reading 
and answering time as it entails pattern recognition) and 
accuracy of answering items was important to capture so 
that we could explore differences in strategies with answer-
ing items correctly or incorrectly.
Analysis
This was a study that employed numeric survey data, timing 
data from reading and answering items, and qualitatively 
analyzed think-aloud data. Think-aloud data were audio-
taped and transcribed. Two coders subsequently scored each 
item for strategy use (analytic, nonanalytic, guess, or com-
bination therein) and number of concepts. These comments 
were coded independent of data on item difficulty.
The quantitative analyses consisted of four parts. First, 
we calculated each participant’s average think-aloud word 
count, number of concepts, reading time, and answering 
time across MCQs, and the total number of correct answers. 
Word count, number of concepts and times were used to 
help distinguish analytic from non-analytic reasoning in 
conjunction with our think-aloud coding procedure. Next, 
we performed descriptive statistics of these measures and 
conducted Pearson correlation analysis between these mea-
sures as well as working hours in the last 3 days and last 
48 hours reported by the participants in the pre-survey to 
address the question of the influence of fatigue on reasoning 
process use. We repeated this procedure for all MCQs, hard 
MCQs only, and easy MCQs only; the last two procedures 
were used to inform the investigation of the impact of hard 
or easy categories on dual process use and accuracy.
Table 1 Percentages correct and incorrect answers for the hard items 
and easy items (by p-value) and over the total set of items by type of 
reasoning
Non 
analytical
Com-
bined
Ana-
lytical
Guess-
ing
Rest
‘Hard’ correct 48 34 10 3 5
‘Hard’ incorrect 30 29 18 16 6
‘Easy’ correct 61 28 6 4 1
‘Easy’ incorrect 39 28 11 19 3
Total correct 56 30 7 4 3
Total incorrect 33 29 16 17 5
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was around 60 %. When a combined approach was used this 
chance dropped to only 50 % and with analytical reasoning 
it dropped to 30–35 %. As the literature has found that the 
ability to correctly solve a problem by non-analytical rea-
soning is dependent on exposure to this or similar problems 
[17], the table seems to suggest that the difficulty of an item 
may be more strongly related to the individual experience 
of the candidate than to an innate property of the item, and 
a p-value is more an indication of the probably that a can-
didate has been exposed to the problem at hand than of the 
complexity of the problem.
Table 2 shows the correlation between the variables used 
in the study.
Significant correlations were found between the numbers 
of hours worked with word count and numbers of concepts 
used in the reasoning. This would support our assumption 
that fatigue has an influence on a person’s ability to use non-
analytical reasoning process when solving a problem. There 
was a significant negative relationship between answering 
time and the probability of a correct answer (− 0.64). Nota-
bly, however, there was no significant correlation found 
between the hours worked and the total number of correct 
answers.
The correlational pattern in Table 3 is less clear. Although 
a significant negative correlation was found between one 
measure of fatigue (number of hours worked in the last 3 
Examples: Based on the data provided in this question, the 
answer is either X or Y which is based on how one weighs 
the supporting data, which include the following….
The answer is either B or C and I am leaning towards B 
because of the following features….
Nonanalytic reasoning was recognized when the examinee 
explicitly demonstrated that they were chunking data, form-
ing a pattern.
Examples: The patient has X, Y, and Z—this is the diagnosis.
So, it is clear that this patient has heart failure.
Combined strategy was used when the participant vocalized 
using both nonanalytic and analytic reasoning.
Example: These symptoms and findings mean that the 
patient has X diagnosis, but this additional finding suggests 
diagnosis Y or X.
Regardless of whether the questions were classified as ‘hard’ 
or ‘easy’ depending on their national item statistics or were 
analyzed as a total group, non-analytical reasoning led to 
the correct answer more often than to an incorrect answer. In 
fact, in all those item groups the chance of a correct answer 
Table 2 Descriptive statistics of the measures and Pearson correlations between them when all MCQs, only hard MCQs, or only easy MCQs were 
included
Measures Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Average word 
count
126.80 40.66 – .64a − 0.09 − 0.34 0.24 0.49b 0.57a
136.35 45.53 – 0.68a − 0.24 − 0.28 0.33 0.47b 0.54b
114.53 35.54 – 0.56a − 0.53b − 0.27 0.07 0.53b 0.60a
2. Average number of 
concepts
6.67 2.35 – 0.12 − 0.35 0.17 0.40 0.54b
7.25 2.48 – − 0.18 − 0.24 0.24 0.42 0.55b
5.91 2.26 – − 0.44 − 0.40 0.13 0.35 0.50b
3. Average reading 
time
26372.50 7839.84 – 0.06 0.20 0.08 0.18
27381.91 6733.25 – − 0.002 0.19 − 0.05 − 0.13
25508.05 5901.04 – 0.39 0.07 − 0.08 − 0.18
4. Average answering 
time
6526.87 667.00 – − 0.64a 0.10 0.06
7049.51 756.03 – − 0.35 − 0.09 − 0.06
5854.90 816.77 – − 0.63a 0.30 0.18
5. Total number of 
correct answers
13.55 3.25 – − 0.14 − 0.11
5.40 2.14 – − 0.12 − 0.07
8.15 1.79 – − 0.11 − 0.12
6. Hours worked in 
the last 3 days
25.10 10.50 – 0.95a
7. Hours worked in 
the last 48 hours
17.23 6.83 –
aP < 0.01.
bP < 0.05.
The number in the first line of each cell was the statistic when all MCQs were included. In the second line the number in bold was the statistic 
when only hard MCQs were included and the number in the third line in italic was the statistic when only easy questions were included.
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were included, 19 % of the variance of correctness could 
be explained by the frequency of expression of these three 
think-aloud processes. If only easy MCQs were taken into 
account, this variance increased to 32 %. If only hard MCQs 
were included, this variance was 16 %.
Discussion
In this study we sought to better understand the relationship 
between faculty physicians’ (experts) reasoning processes 
and psychometrically determined difficulty of national 
examination assessment items. In addition, we studied the 
influence that sleep deprivation might have on this relation-
ship. Further, we tried to contribute to the ongoing debate 
that exists in the medical education literature regarding the 
potential benefits of analytic, nonanalytic, and combined 
processes with limited data exploring verbalized thought 
processes.
We believe the results are noteworthy with respect to 
expert performance, despite the small-scale nature of the 
study. First, we found evidence underpinning the notion that 
difficulty of an item in a test is not a systematic feature of 
the item itself but always a result of the interaction between 
the item and the candidate. This is notable because generally 
the interaction between candidate and item (PxI) is treated 
as part of the error term [23]. P-values—as in classical test 
theory—are therefore more an indication of the probability 
days) and non-analytical reasoning, this was not the case 
with the other measure of fatigue (number of hours worked 
in the last 48 h). Again, no direct relationship between fatigue 
and correctness of the answers could be demonstrated.
Finally, Table 4 presents the results of multiple linear 
regression models when the think-aloud processes of com-
bined approach, analytic reasoning, and non-analytic rea-
soning were all entered as explanatory variables for the 
outcome of number of correct answers. When all MCQs 
Table 3 Pearson correlations between analytic, combined, and nonanalytic think-aloud processes with correctness and working hours when all 
MCQs, only hard MCQs, or only easy MCQs were included
Measures 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1. Non-analytic reasoning – − .071a − 0.35 0.14 − 0.24 − 0.48b − 0.44
– 0.64a − 0.32 0.01 − 0.27 − 0.32 − 0.32
– 0.74a − 0.30 − 0.02 − 0.26 − 0.57a − 0.50b
2. Combined approach – − 0.24 − 0.52b 0.43 0.41 0.35
– − 0.22 − 0.52b 0.22 0.44 0.43
– − 0.37 − 0.30 0.51b 0.29 0.19
3. Analytic reasoning – 0.02 − 0.15 0.20 0.25
– − 0.05 0.28 0.01 0.08
– 0.14 − 0.39 0.43 0.44
4. Guessing – − 0.27 − 0.41 − 0.45b
– − 0.24 − 0.41 − 0.48b
– 0.03 − 0.18 − 0.09
5. Correctness – − 0.14 − 0.11
– − 0.12 − 0.07
– − 0.11 − 0.12
6. Hours worked in the last 3 days – 0.95a
7. Hours worked in the last 48 h –
aP < 0.01.
bP < 0.05.
The number in the first line of each cell was the statistic when all MCQs were included. In the second line the number in bold was the statistic 
when only hard MCQs were included and the number in the third line in italic was the statistic when only easy questions were included.
Table 4 Multiple linear regression models to examine the associations 
between think-aloud processes and correctness of answers when all 
MCQs, only hard MCQs, or only easy MCQs were included
Ex-
planatory 
variables
Unstan-
dardized 
coefficient
Standard 
error
Stan-
dardized 
coefficient
Total 
model 
R2
F-
value
Combined 
approach
0.34 0.29 0.56
0.23 0.24 0.35
0.14 0.50 0.21
Analytic 
reasoning
0.04 0.40 0.04
0.38 0.30 0.38
− 0.53 0.72 − 0.38
Non-
analytic 
reasoning
0.11 0.32 0.17 0.19 1.25
0.05 0.25 0.07 0.16 1.05
− 0.15 0.50 − 0.22 0.32 2.49
The number in the first line of each cell was the statistic when all 
MCQs were included. In the second line the number in bold was the 
statistic when only hard MCQs were included and the number in the 
third line in italic was the statistic when only easy questions were 
included.
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rather support and offer a further explanation for context 
specificity and idiosyncrasy of problem solving.
An additional notable finding is the relationship between 
fatigue and numbers of concepts and words in the reason-
ing process. If fatigue were to lead to more diagnostic 
errors due to premature closure, one would have expected 
an inverse relationship. Our correlation between number of 
words and concepts in the reasoning, however, suggests that 
fatigue impacts on diagnostic accuracy because it induces 
an impairment of the non-analytical process and therefore 
requires more analytical reasoning for a problem that the 
person would be able to solve non-analytically had he/she 
not been fatigued or sleep deprived. In other words, instead 
of leading to premature closure one could suggest it leads to 
‘premature opening’. We must reiterate, however, that the 
numbers of our study are small and that the correlational 
pattern is not equivocal. The validity of using the hours 
worked in the last 3 days and 48 h as a measure of fatigue 
is yet to be investigated more closely with a larger sample. 
Yet there were no significant correlations contradicting our 
conclusions.
The limitations of our study include the relatively small 
sample size. One could also argue whether written questions 
are the best proxy for actual practical clinical reasoning. 
Unfortunately, using a think-aloud protocol in real time in 
actual practice is not possible. The items, on the other hand, 
were taken from a well-validated national test and had all 
undergone rigorous quality assurance. We believe our find-
ings warrant further research and perhaps replication of this 
study on a larger scale to obtain clearer correlation patterns.
 ● Essentials: We found evidence underpinning the notion 
that difficulty of an item in a test is not a systematic fea-
ture of the item itself but always a result of the interac-
tion between the item and the candidate.
 ● Another finding from our cohort of experts is the appar-
ent artificiality of the dichotomy between System 1 and 
System 2.
 ● Fatigue impacts on diagnostic accuracy because it 
induces an impairment of the non-analytical process and 
therefore requires more analytical reasoning for a prob-
lem that the person would be able to solve non-analyti-
cally had he/she not been fatigued or sleep deprived.
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that a candidate has had exposure to the problem described 
in the item than the intrinsic complexity of the item itself. 
This is not completely counter-intuitive: for example read-
ing is quite a complex ability, yet it is something we typi-
cally do without much analytical thinking.
Another finding from our cohort of experts is the appar-
ent artificiality of the dichotomy between System 1 and 
System 2. Often it is suggested that humans solve problems 
by either using one system or the other. We think, and our 
results support, that this is at least debatable. The use of 
both processes simultaneously (System 1 and System 2) is 
also consistent with work from other fields [9]. The cases in 
which the answer was provided in one single concept may 
be indicative of pure System 1 processing, but in all other 
cases the concepts mentioned and manipulated in the short-
term memory were chunks of information and as such again 
recognized patterns. To illustrate what we mean we will 
use the reading analogy further. When reading, recogniz-
ing letters is a non-analytical process for the more novice 
reader, recognizing (simple) words for the intermediate and 
recognizing complicated, long words and perhaps whole 
sentences of the expert reader. All apply both analytical and 
non-analytical processes but the chunks they process are 
more or less information rich. Our data suggest that it is not 
either System 1 or System 2 that the subjects applied but 
anywhere on the scale and some more at the extremes. In 
this view, the non-analytical extreme would be processing 
the whole problem as one single chunk.
In the introduction we described a paradox that easy 
problems are best solved by analytical reasoning and multi-
factorial complex problems best by non-analytical reason-
ing, and yet for the expert complex problems are simple 
and for the novice simple problems can be complex. Our 
results suggest that this indeed is a paradox and not a con-
tradiction. If the difficulty of a problem is mainly the result 
of the interaction between the candidate and the problem 
at hand, it means that a problem that can be solved with 
large chunks of non-analytical reasoning is not a difficult 
problem (it might be to others) and therefore analytical rea-
soning to manipulate large chunks in their working memory 
would require little effort. For a novice, on the other hand, 
analytically reasoning through a problem that for them is 
still multi-factorial (because it has to be processed in many 
small chunks) surpasses the limitation of their cognitive 
architecture [24]. This would underpin further the notion 
in expertise theory that one can only be an expert at a cer-
tain problem by (repeated) exposure and learning [17, 22] 
and that someone who is regarded as an expert is only seen 
as such because he/she is an expert at the many individual 
problems he/she has had the time and exposure to master. 
So being an expert is not only a matter of quality but rather 
of quantity. In summary, our findings do not contradict but 
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